Description
A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key.

### Evidence
**pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names**
```go
func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
result := []fs.FileInfo{}
for _, im := range f.images {
result = append(result, im)
}
return result, nil
}

func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) {
f.log.Info("Open", "path", name)
if name == "/" {
return f, nil
}
...
```

**cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS**
```go
http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem()))

go func() {
server := &http.Server{
Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084"
ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
}
err := server.ListenAndServe()
```

**pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image**
```go
func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File {
source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret)
return ignition_config_types_32.File{
Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"},
...
```

### Attack Pattern
Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Published: 2026-11-03
Score: 7.1 High
EPSS: < 1% Very Low
KEV: No
AI Analysis

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Remediation

Vendor Workaround

There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected. --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-11-04) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to enforce NetworkPolicy to restrict ingress traffic to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod, isolating the unauthenticated HTTP file server from cluster workloads: upgrade to the fixed Openshift4/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel/Openshift5/Ose Image Customization Controller Rhel builds, which apply the documented input check, closing all 2 injection vectors (HTTP root directory listing enumeration, unauthenticated image retrieval and secret extraction). Until patched, this is a concern on OpenShift bare metal IPI clusters running the image-customization-controller, so Apply NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to restrict port 8084 access strictly to authorized BMC and provisioning network hosts, blocking workload pods from accessing the service. As a compensating measure, Rotate exposed cluster pull secrets and ramdisk SSH keys to limit their operational validity window if unauthorized provisioning network access is suspected. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unauthenticated directory listing exposure defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate. Highest-impact CME: CME-805 Credential Rotation Policy (medium)

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History

Thu, 05 Nov 2026 01:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Redhat openshift Container Platform
Vendors & Products Redhat openshift Container Platform

Wed, 04 Nov 2026 00:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

 threat_severity

Important

Tue, 03 Nov 2026 18:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description A flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key. ### Evidence **pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names** ```go func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() result := []fs.FileInfo{} for _, im := range f.images { result = append(result, im) } return result, nil } func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { f.log.Info("Open", "path", name) if name == "/" { return f, nil } ... ``` **cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS** ```go http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem())) go func() { server := &http.Server{ Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084" ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, } err := server.ListenAndServe() ``` **pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image** ```go func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File { source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret) return ignition_config_types_32.File{ Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"}, ... ``` ### Attack Pattern Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.
Title Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret
First Time appeared Redhat
Redhat openshift
Weaknesses CWE-548
CPEs cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4
cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:5
Vendors & Products Redhat
Redhat openshift
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N'}

Subscriptions

Redhat Openshift Openshift Container Platform
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: redhat

Published:

Updated: 2026-11-05T02:19:12.537Z

Reserved: 2026-08-31T14:59:35.045Z

Link: CVE-2026-82976

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Awaiting Analysis

Published: 2026-11-03T19:18:10.850

Modified: 2026-11-03T19:18:10.993

Link: CVE-2026-82976

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Important

Publid Date: 2026-11-03T12:03:30Z

Links: CVE-2026-82976 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-11-05T01:15:14Z

Weaknesses