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Search Results (4 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-77372 | 1 Veracrypt | 1 Veracrypt | 2026-11-05 | N/A |
| VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.30, the Unix, macOS, and FreeBSD serialization paths in src/Platform/Serializer.cpp and src/Volume/VolumePassword.cpp accept untrusted length and count values when deserializing data that can cross from the unprivileged GUI or CLI to the root CoreService helper. Serializer::DeserializeWString allocates floor(size / sizeof(wchar_t)) elements but reads size bytes, so a non-aligned size can overflow the heap allocation. VolumePassword::Deserialize accepts PasswordSize values larger than the fixed 128-byte PasswordBuffer, allowing downstream DataPtr() and Size() consumers such as the KDF to read beyond the buffer. DeserializeString, DeserializeWString, and the string and wide-string list readers also lack allocation and collection bounds, which can exhaust memory, and a zero-length DeserializeString can access an empty vector. Windows uses a different path, and the immediate CoreService pipe writer is the same-user parent process, so the documented exposure is a local defense-in-depth boundary rather than a remote attack. This issue is fixed in 1.26.30. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77572 | 1 Veracrypt | 1 Veracrypt | 2026-10-18 | 3.3 Low |
| VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. In 1.26.29 and earlier, selected metadata IOCTL handlers in the VeraCrypt Windows veracrypt.sys driver accept caller-supplied object-manager and device paths broader than supported VeraCrypt workflows require. A local user who can open the intentionally user-accessible \.\VeraCrypt device can use TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK, TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO, VC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX, or the legacy TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY handler to make src/Driver/Ntdriver.c perform kernel-context symbolic-link or disk-device lookups outside the intended path scope. This can disclose low-sensitivity drive-letter targets, partition information, disk geometry, GPT or MBR state, and limited object-manager path metadata. | ||||
| CVE-2026-53762 | 1 Veracrypt | 1 Veracrypt | 2026-08-26 | 6.2 Medium |
| VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.29, non-default builds created with WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND route SHA-256 and SHA-512 volume-header key derivation through derive_key_sha256 and derive_key_sha512 in src/Crypto/wolfCrypt.c, where the configured iterations value is discarded and wc_HKDF is used instead of PBKDF2-HMAC. Changing the PIM or iteration count therefore does not increase derivation cost, allowing an attacker with an affected container, disk image, or volume header to perform substantially cheaper offline password guesses. Official precompiled VeraCrypt binaries and normal distribution packages use the standard PBKDF2 backend and are not affected. Volumes created by an affected WOLFCRYPT=1 build require backup and recreation because corrected builds derive different keys. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29. | ||||
| CVE-2026-54073 | 1 Veracrypt | 1 Veracrypt | 2026-08-21 | N/A |
| VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. From 1.26.6 until 1.26.29, file-hosted hidden volume creation forces quick format and the FormatNoFs function in src/Common/Format.c and FormatFat function in src/Common/Fat.c use WriteFile to place raw zeroed sectors at predictable 128 MiB intervals. These writes bypass the normal EncryptDataUnits formatting path, leaving deterministic plaintext markers in an area expected to resemble random ciphertext. The markers can weaken plausible deniability during forensic inspection, although they do not disclose hidden-volume content or reduce the strength of VeraCrypt encryption. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29. | ||||
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