| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: don't let rds_conn_shutdown() consume a concurrent drop
rds_conn_shutdown() finishes by moving the path from
RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and also accepts
RDS_CONN_ERROR as the starting state of that final transition, so that
a FIN processed in softirq context during the teardown does not derail
the shutdown into a noisy error path.
But consuming that RDS_CONN_ERROR also consumes the shutdown pass that
came with it: rds_conn_path_drop() sets RDS_CONN_ERROR and then queues
cp_down_w, and a pass that starts on a path already in RDS_CONN_DOWN
is a no-op. For the FIN case that is harmless - the socket the FIN
arrived on is the very socket the teardown just released. It is not
harmless for a dropper that attached something to the path first.
rds_tcp_accept_one() is such a dropper. Its path claim in
rds_tcp_accept_one_path() transitions RDS_CONN_DOWN ->
RDS_CONN_CONNECTING, and a concurrent drop - a FIN on a previous
socket in softirq context, an administrative reset - can put the path
into RDS_CONN_ERROR between that claim and the state check that
follows, which accepts RDS_CONN_ERROR. The accept then installs the
freshly accepted socket with rds_tcp_set_callbacks() while the queued
teardown - which sampled tc->t_sock before this socket existed - is
still running. rds_connect_path_complete() fails its transition to
RDS_CONN_UP and drops the path again, queueing the pass that should
reap the socket it just installed. If the in-flight shutdown's final
transition consumes that drop's RDS_CONN_ERROR, the queued pass finds
the path in RDS_CONN_DOWN and does nothing. The installed socket is
never torn down: it sits established with its callbacks armed and its
rds_tcp_connection on rds_tcp_tc_list, the peer sees a connection that
nothing ever reads, and the path is wedged in RDS_CONN_DOWN until some
later event drops it again. Reproduced with widened race windows as
an ever-growing receive queue on a socket owned by a path stuck in
RDS_CONN_DOWN, with the peer's send path wedged behind it.
Make the final transition only DISCONNECTING -> DOWN. If it fails
because the path is in RDS_CONN_ERROR, a drop raced the teardown:
cancel the reconnect timer and clear RDS_RECONNECT_PENDING - the one
piece of the skipped tail that must not be left behind - and return,
letting the pass the drop queued finish the job: it tears down
whatever attached to the path in the meantime, completes the
transition to RDS_CONN_DOWN, and re-arms the reconnect from its own
tail.
The timer quiesce in that branch matters because the racing drop does
not always queue that pass: rds_conn_path_drop() returns without
queueing when a destroy is pending - exactly the situation during a
netns teardown or module unload, when a FIN on the dying socket is
processed while rds_conn_path_destroy() flushes cp_down_w. If the
flushed pass is the one that takes this return, no later pass exists,
and rds_conn_path_destroy() would find cp_conn_w still armed
(WARN_ON) and then free a path whose reconnect timer can still fire.
With the cancel in the branch, every exit of a shutdown pass leaves
the timer quiesced no matter which pass completes the transition.
The FIN case keeps making progress, one pass later and still without
noisy logging. Any other state keeps today's rds_conn_path_error()
handling; no current cp_state writer can leave a DISCONNECTING path
in anything but RDS_CONN_ERROR (every other writer is a cmpxchg from
a non-DISCONNECTING state), so that branch is defensive.
On kernels without the preceding patches the same hazard exists with
the sample-based quiesce; the fix applies there equally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: cope with concurrent instance destruction
Instances are refcounted. However, only memory release happens on the
1 -> 0 transition; the unlink from hashes can occur with any refcount.
Uncooperative userspace can force a situation where a queue is pending
for destruction from netlink event while a different socket with same
portid processes an UNBIND request.
With right timing, this will unhash the instance again:
Oops: general protection fault, [..]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nfulnl_recv_config+0x31a/0xd50
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7c2/0xeb0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost-vdpa: don't install the eventfd_ctx_fdget() error in config_ctx
vhost_vdpa_set_config_call() swaps the eventfd_ctx_fdget() return value
into v->config_ctx before checking it, so on failure the field briefly
holds an ERR_PTR:
ctx = fd == VHOST_FILE_UNBIND ? NULL : eventfd_ctx_fdget(fd);
swap(ctx, v->config_ctx);
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ctx))
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (IS_ERR(v->config_ctx)) {
long ret = PTR_ERR(v->config_ctx);
v->config_ctx = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit 0bde59c1723a ("vhost-vdpa: set v->config_ctx to NULL if
eventfd_ctx_fdget() fails") added that clearing, and spelled out the
invariant the rest of the file relies on: "we consider 'v->config_ctx'
valid if it is not NULL". The window between the swap and the clearing
still breaks it. vhost_vdpa_config_cb() only tests for NULL, so a config
interrupt delivered inside the window hands the ERR_PTR to
eventfd_signal().
Check the fd before installing it instead. That closes the window and
matches how vhost_vring_ioctl() handles the same failure for the vq call
fd.
It also stops a rejected fd from tearing down a config interrupt that was
working: until now the swap replaced the live context and put it, so
after an EBADF the device silently stopped delivering config interrupts
until userspace installed a new fd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: mediatek: Protect root bus removal with rescan lock
Hold the pci_rescan_remove_lock lock while stopping and removing a root bus
to avoid racing with concurrent rescan or hotplug operations triggered via
sysfs. Such races may lead to use-after-free issues or system crashes.
[bhelgaas: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix reloc root cleanup in merge_reloc_roots()
If the root we got has zero root refs in its root item, we are resetting
the root's ->reloc_root without using barriers like we do everywhere else.
Sashiko complained about this while reviewing another patch, and it's
correct (see the Link tag below).
Also, we should not clear BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE from the root unless
the root points to the reloc root we have.
Fix this by using clear_reloc_root(), which issues the memory barrier
after setting the root's ->reloc_root to NULL and before clearing the bit
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE from the root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: safely drain sessions during logoff
SMB3 multichannel allows requests for one session to run on multiple
connections. Wait for all channels bound to a session before freeing
shared session objects.
A deferred byte-range lock remains counted as a running request and only
wakes when its file closes. Wake blocked locks during the drain without
unpublishing or modifying their file objects. Synchronous CANCEL requests
must invoke their cancellation callback to wake pending operations, while
CHANGE_NOTIFY completion remains specific to the asynchronous path.
Serialize session teardown with channel registration and previous-session
cleanup, and use atomic work-state transitions so LOGOFF, CANCEL, and
connection teardown invoke cancellation callbacks only once. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: plda: Protect root bus removal with rescan lock
Hold the pci_rescan_remove_lock lock while stopping and removing a root bus
to avoid racing with concurrent rescan or hotplug operations triggered via
sysfs. Such races may lead to use-after-free issues or system crashes.
[bhelgaas: commit log] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: take n->list_lock in __slab_try_return_freelist() to avoid race
Commit ba7425312607 ("mm, slab: add an optimistic
__slab_try_return_freelist()") incorrectly assumed that nobody has freed
an object to the slab as long as slab->freelist is NULL and cmpxchg
succeeds.
However, as reported by Hyunwoo Kim [1], other CPUs might have freed
an object to the slab, insert the slab to the partial list, then
allocated an object from the slab, and be in the middle of removing
the slab from the list under n->list_lock.
Since __refill_objects_node() puts the slab back on pc.slabs
outside n->list_lock, it might insert the slab into that list while
the slab is concurrently being removed from n->partial.
This led to a list corruption [1]:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev
(ffff888100000248), but was dead000000000122.
(next=ffffea000416e410).
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 65534 PID: 144 Comm: poc Not tainted
7.2.0-16172-gcf72cbb39da8-dirty #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x80/0xd0
...
Call Trace:
alloc_from_new_slab+0x183/0x300
___slab_alloc+0x31c/0x890
__kmalloc_noprof+0x3d4/0x800
lsm_blob_alloc+0x2d/0x50
security_msg_msg_alloc+0x26/0x90
load_msg+0x1aa/0x210
do_msgsnd+0x91/0x800
do_syscall_64+0x109/0x5d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
This is a classic ABA problem where cmpxchg succeeds but the state has
changed since __refill_objects_node() took the freelist from the slab.
As Vlastimil Babka mentioned [2], it should be rare to return more than
one slab (due to the racy read of slab->counters in
get_partial_node_bulk()). Therefore, instead of introducing additional
complexity, acquire and release n->list_lock twice in the worst case.
Return the slab directly to the partial list and hold n->list_lock
across the cmpxchg and add_partial(). This is similar to the initial
version of commit ba7425312607 [3]. This is enough to avoid the race as
the list manipulation is serialized by n->list_lock. While at it,
bring back unlikely() hint now that the condition is unlikely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: perf: Retrieve path and source from event data
ETM perf callbacks currently use the per-CPU csdev_src pointer, which
can race with updates during device registration and unregistration.
The AUX setup already builds and stores the path in the event data.
Use this path to retrieve the source instead of csdev_src to avoid
the race.
Export coresight_get_source() and add etm_event_get_ctxt_path() to
retrieve the context's path and its source with READ_ONCE() /
WRITE_ONCE() accessors. Give the comments to explain why this
approach is safe when pause or resume callbacks preempt the disable
callback (e.g. via NMI). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/alternatives: Exclude text poking against change_page_attr()
From time to time, the following BUG can be observed
in the x86 alternatives patching code [0]:
> kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:2576!
> Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 355 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 7.1.3-1-default #1 PREEMPT(full) openSUSE Tumbleweed 8c1795b03ec64f997e57a8ad38b1161e3b98da64
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS unknown 02/02/2022
> RIP: 0010:__text_poke+0x2aa/0x450
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> smp_text_poke_batch_finish+0x2a7/0x320
> __static_call_transform+0xb7/0x220
> arch_static_call_transform+0x5b/0xb0
> __static_call_init+0xe9/0x270
> static_call_module_notify+0x11f/0x150
> notifier_call_chain+0x61/0xe0
> blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x63/0xc0
> load_module+0x1c92/0x20c0
> init_module_from_file+0xd8/0x140
> idempotent_init_module+0x100/0x2f0
> __x64_sys_finit_module+0x71/0xe0
> do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
which matches the following BUG_ON() in alternative.c:
/*
* If something went wrong, crash and burn since recovery paths are not
* implemented.
*/
BUG_ON(!pages[0] || (cross_page_boundary && !pages[1]));
This can happen if vmalloc_to_page() fails, for any reason. Such can happen
if text poking races with CPA, which can possibly result in the collapsing
of page tables (or breaking of PMD hugepages). It is not a problem for most
users of vmalloc_to_page() (they solely own the vmalloc'd range) but, when
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_EXECMEM_ROX=y, various modules own a single execmem vmalloc
range, and can call set_memory_*() in parallel on it. This can happen to
race against __text_poke and cause havoc in vmalloc_to_page().
Fix it by excluding against CPA using the init_mm mmap read lock.
[ dhansen: Fix up SoB ordering. The actual code flow here was:
Pedro=>Lorenzo=>Mike=>Me which is reflected in the SoB chain
now. I *believe* Mike simply picked up Lorenzo's update to
Pedro's post from the Link ] |
| A race condition in the ZPA tunnel handler of affected versions of Zscaler Client Connector (ZCC) allows a heap corruption, resulting in a denial of service (client crash) and potentially arbitrary code execution in the context of the ZCC process. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/nldev: Fix locking when accessing mr->pd
Sashiko points out that, due to rereg_mr, the PD is actually variable and
all the touches in nldev are racy.
Use mr->device instead of mr->pd->device.
Getting the PD restrack ID is more tricky. To avoid disturbing all the
happy paths, add an rdma_restrack_sync() operation which is sort of like
flush_workqueue() or synchronize_irq(): after it returns, all the old
nldev touches to the mr are gone and everything sees the new PD. This
makes it safe to reach into the PD pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix subbuf resize race with ring buffer readers
trace_buffer subbuf_size is read lockless in ring_buffer_read_page() and
ring_buffer_read_start(), while it can simultaneously be resized with
ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set().
Instead of trace_buffer::subbuf_size, use bpage::order in
ring_buffer_read_start() and ring_buffer_read_page().
In ring_buffer_read_start(), even with resize_disabled, there is still a
possibility of a race with a buffer modification. Hold the trace_buffer
mutex to synchronise with any pending ring buffer order modification.
trace_buffer::subbuf_size is now actually useless, remove it. Also,
create accessors rb_subbuf_capacity() and rb_page_capacity() which
return the actual size available for storing events, while
rb_subbuf_size() returns the actual subbuf page-size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.
We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).
If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rseq: Prevent hard lockup on granted time slice extension
__exit_to_user_mode_loop() invokes rseq_grant_timeslice_extension() with
interrupts enabled. If the extension is granted it invokes
hrtimer_rearm_deferred_tif() to ensure that a pending deferred hrtimer
rearm is handled before exiting to user space.
Though this invokes __hrtimer_rearm_deferred() which expects to be invoked
with interrupts disabled as it takes hrtimer_cpu_base::lock with
raw_spin_lock(). That's a livelock waiting to happen and caught by lockdep:
WARNING: ./include/linux/hrtimer_rearm.h:17 at irqentry_exit, CPU#1: slice_test
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
inconsistent {IN-HARDIRQ-W} -> {HARDIRQ-ON-W} usage.
Prevent this by disabling interrupts around the invocation of
hrtimer_rearm_deferred_tif() in rseq_grant_timeslice_extension().
[ tglx: Massaged change log ] |
| A vulnerability was identified in Linux Kernel up to 4.19.316/5.4.278/5.10.220/5.15.161. This impacts the function tcp_getsockopt/tcp_setsockopt of the component TCP Handler. Such manipulation leads to race condition. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vulnerability was introduced in 2.6.12, commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2"). Upgrading to version 4.19.317, 5.4.279, 5.10.221, 5.15.162 and 6.1 will fix this issue. The name of the patch is fcd31dd8291b23d713245947ec2b2d99ef07aef2/3b32f265805a49071e2c4568a524398ba22bf93c/d529193eae979a7bf2255cd9fe68b7af7a1c91b3/5bb642cc3355ffd3c8bca0a8bd8e6e65bcc2091c/f49cd2f4d6170d27a2c61f1fecb03d8a70c91f57. The affected component should be upgraded. |
| Race condition in the JavaScript Engine component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 153.1, Thunderbird 154, and Thunderbird 153.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix race between update_event_fields and, event_define_fields
The following sequence may leads race between event_define_fields()
and update_event_fields():
CPU0 (loads module A) CPU1 (loads module B)
=============================== ===============================
load_module(A) load_module(B)
notifier_call_chain notifier_call_chain
trace_module_notify trace_module_notify
mutex_lock(&event_mutex) trace_event_update_all()
trace_module_add_events(A) down_write(&trace_event_sem)
__register_event(call_A)
__add_event_to_tracers(call_A)
event_define_fields(call_A)
for each f: list_for_each_entry(field,
list_add(&f->link, &class->fields, link)
&class->fields) field = class->fields->next;
Where access to the class->fields is not protected by the event_mutex in
trace_event_update_all().
This produces the following panic:
Unable to handle kernel access ... at virtual address 0000000000000018
pc : update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368
Call trace:
update_event_fields+0xf8/0x368
trace_event_update_all+0x7c/0x2b4
trace_module_notify+0x4c/0x1dc
notifier_call_chain+0x84/0x168
blocking_notifier_call_chain_robust+0x64/0xd4
load_module+0x10c8/0x123c
__arm64_sys_finit_module+0x230/0x31c
Fix by taking event_mutex in trace_event_update_all() before
trace_event_sem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Serialize accesses to the owner and mirror list with separate lock
Interaction between KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM and
KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM can cause two separate issues:
- in sev_migrate_from(), when the destination KVM is a mirror, the mirror
entry is moved from the source's list to the owner's mirror_vms list,
without holding the owner's lock unlike other writers of the owner's
mirror list (sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(), sev_vm_destroy()).
A concurrent COPY or destroy can race with sev_migrate_from() and
corrupt the list.
- In sev_vm_destroy(), the *owner* is still active and could receive
concurrently a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM that causes
sev->enc_context_owner to change. In this case the incorrect VM
receives kvm_put_kvm().
The second issue needs particular care because the owner could disappear
altogether (even though the race window is impossibly small) between
reading it and locking it. There is thus no way to perform the checks
under the owner lock without putting struct kvm under SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
(which would allow kvm_get_kvm_safe() under RCU critical section).
It is much simpler to just use a global lock, since the critical
sections are so small and the new lock is always a leaf lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: mt7621: avoid corruption of shared interrupt trigger state
The bank-shared fields like 'rising' and 'falling' are modified using
non-atomic read-modify-write operations. Since every gpio chip instance
represents an entire bank of 32 pins, if 'mediatek_gpio_irq_type()' is
called concurrently for different IRQs on the same bank a possible overwrite
of each other's configuration is possible. Thus, protect this state with
'gpio_generic_lock_irqsave' lock in the same way it is handled in irp_chip
'mediatek_gpio_irq_mask()' and 'mediatek_gpio_irq_unmask()' callbacks. |
