| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by incorrect nat_entry flag usage
f2fs_need_dentry_mark() reads nat_entry flags without mutual exclusion
with the checkpoint path, which can result in an incorrect inode block
marking state. The scenario is as follows:
create & write & fsync 'file A' write checkpoint
- f2fs_do_sync_file // inline inode
- f2fs_write_inode // inode folio is dirty
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_flush_merged_writes
- f2fs_sync_node_pages
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // no dirty node
- f2fs_need_inode_block_update // return true
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // inode dirtied
- f2fs_need_dentry_mark //return true
- f2fs_flush_nat_entries
- f2fs_write_checkpoint end
- __write_node_folio // inode with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still
with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
The state observed by f2fs_need_dentry_mark() can differ from the state
observed in __write_node_folio() after acquiring sbi->node_write. The
root cause is that the semantics of IS_CHECKPOINTED and
HAS_FSYNCED_INODE are only guaranteed after the checkpoint write has
fully completed.
This patch moves set_dentry_mark() into __write_node_folio() and
protects it with the sbi->node_write lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: clean the sfp upstream if phy probing fails
Sashiko reported that we don't call sfp_bus_del_upstream() in the probe
failure path, so let's add it, otherwise the sfp-bus is left with a
dangling 'upstream' field, that may be used later on during SFP events.
This issue existed before the generic phylib sfp support, back when
drivers were calling phy_sfp_probe themselves. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: disable BH before calling udp_tunnel_xmit_skb()
udp_tunnel_xmit_skb() / udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb() are expected to run with
BH disabled. After commit 6f1a9140ecda ("add xmit recursion limit to
tunnel xmit functions"), on the path:
udp(6)_tunnel_xmit_skb() -> ip(6)tunnel_xmit()
dev_xmit_recursion_inc()/dec() must stay balanced on the same CPU.
Without local_bh_disable(), the context may move between CPUs, which can
break the inc/dec pairing. This may lead to incorrect recursion level
detection and cause packets to be dropped in ip(6)_tunnel_xmit() or
__dev_queue_xmit().
Fix it by disabling BH around both IPv4 and IPv6 SCTP UDP xmit paths.
In my testing, after enabling the SCTP over UDP:
# ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
# ip net exec ha sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899
# ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.udp_port=9899
# ip net exec hb sysctl -w net.sctp.encap_port=9899
# ip net exec ha iperf3 -s
- without this patch:
# ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
[ 5] 0.00-10.00 sec 37.2 MBytes 31.2 Mbits/sec sender
[ 5] 0.00-10.00 sec 37.1 MBytes 31.1 Mbits/sec receiver
- with this patch:
# ip net exec hb iperf3 -c 192.168.0.1 --sctp
[ 5] 0.00-10.00 sec 3.14 GBytes 2.69 Gbits/sec sender
[ 5] 0.00-10.00 sec 3.14 GBytes 2.69 Gbits/sec receiver |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Fix clone_alias() to use the original device's devid
Currently clone_alias() assumes first argument (pdev) is always the
original device pointer. This function is called by
pci_for_each_dma_alias() which based on topology decides to send
original or alias device details in first argument.
This meant that the source devid used to look up and copy the DTE
may be incorrect, leading to wrong or stale DTE entries being
propagated to alias device.
Fix this by passing the original pdev as the opaque data argument to
both the direct clone_alias() call and pci_for_each_dma_alias(). Inside
clone_alias(), retrieve the original device from data and compute devid
from it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: fix missing run load for vcn0 in attr_data_get_block_locked()
When a compressed or sparse attribute has its clusters frame-aligned,
vcn is rounded down to the frame start using cmask, which can result
in vcn != vcn0. In this case, vcn and vcn0 may reside in different
attribute segments.
The code already handles the case where vcn is in a different segment
by loading its runs before allocation. However, it fails to load runs
for vcn0 when vcn0 resides in a different segment than vcn. This causes
run_lookup_entry() to return SPARSE_LCN for vcn0 since its segment was
never loaded into the in-memory run list, triggering the WARN_ON(1).
Fix this by adding a missing check for vcn0 after the existing vcn
segment check. If vcn0 falls outside the current segment range
[svcn, evcn1), find and load the attribute segment containing vcn0
before performing the run lookup.
The following scenario triggers the bug:
attr_data_get_block_locked()
vcn = vcn0 & cmask <- vcn != vcn0 after frame alignment
load runs for vcn segment <- vcn0 segment not loaded!
attr_allocate_clusters() <- allocation succeeds
run_lookup_entry(vcn0) <- vcn0 not in run -> SPARSE_LCN
WARN_ON(1) <- bug fires here! |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: avoid reading already updated pages during GC
We found the following issue during fuzz testing:
page: refcount:3 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000b6e89c65 index:0x18b2dc pfn:0x161ba9
memcg:f8ffff800e269c00
aops:f2fs_meta_aops ino:2
flags: 0x52880000000080a9(locked|waiters|uptodate|lru|private|zone=1|kasantag=0x4a)
raw: 52880000000080a9 fffffffec6e17588 fffffffec0ccc088 a7ffff8067063618
raw: 000000000018b2dc 0000000000000009 00000003ffffffff f8ffff800e269c00
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(folio_test_uptodate(folio))
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
post_alloc_hook+0x58c/0x5ec
prep_new_page+0x34/0x284
get_page_from_freelist+0x2dcc/0x2e8c
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x280/0x76c
__folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0xac
__filemap_get_folio+0x6bc/0xdc4
pagecache_get_page+0x3c/0x104
do_garbage_collect+0x5c78/0x77a4
f2fs_gc+0xd74/0x25f0
gc_thread_func+0xb28/0x2930
kthread+0x464/0x5d8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1563!
folio_end_read+0x140/0x168
f2fs_finish_read_bio+0x5c4/0xb80
f2fs_read_end_io+0x64c/0x708
bio_endio+0x85c/0x8c0
blk_update_request+0x690/0x127c
scsi_end_request+0x9c/0xb8c
scsi_io_completion+0xf0/0x250
scsi_finish_command+0x430/0x45c
scsi_complete+0x178/0x6d4
blk_mq_complete_request+0xcc/0x104
scsi_done_internal+0x214/0x454
scsi_done+0x24/0x34
which is similar to the problem reported by syzbot:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=3686758660f980b402dc
This case is consistent with the description in commit 9bf1a3f
("f2fs: avoid GC causing encrypted file corrupted"):
Page 1 is moved from blkaddr A to blkaddr B by move_data_block, and after
being written it is marked as uptodate. Then, Page 1 is moved from blkaddr
B to blkaddr C, VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO was triggered in the endio initiated by
ra_data_block.
There is no need to read Page 1 again from blkaddr B, since it has already
been updated. Therefore, avoid initiating I/O in this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix data loss caused by incorrect use of nat_entry flag
Data loss can occur when fsync is performed on a newly created file
(before any checkpoint has been written) concurrently with a checkpoint
operation. The scenario is as follows:
create & write & fsync 'file A' write checkpoint
- f2fs_do_sync_file // inline inode
- f2fs_write_inode // inode folio is dirty
- f2fs_write_checkpoint
- f2fs_flush_merged_writes
- f2fs_sync_node_pages
- f2fs_flush_nat_entries
- f2fs_fsync_node_pages // no dirty node
- f2fs_need_inode_block_update // return false
SPO and lost 'file A'
f2fs_flush_nat_entries() sets the IS_CHECKPOINTED and HAS_LAST_FSYNC
flags for the nat_entry, but this does not mean that the checkpoint has
actually completed successfully. However, f2fs_need_inode_block_update()
checks these flags and incorrectly assumes that the checkpoint has
finished.
The root cause is that the semantics of IS_CHECKPOINTED and
HAS_LAST_FSYNC are only guaranteed after the checkpoint write fully
completes.
This patch modifies f2fs_need_inode_block_update() to acquire the
sbi->node_write lock before reading the nat_entry flags, ensuring that
once IS_CHECKPOINTED and HAS_LAST_FSYNC are observed to be set, the
checkpoint operation has already completed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: unify lcn as u64 for 32-bit platforms
As sashiko reported [1], `lcn` was typed as `unsigned long` (or
`unsigned int` sometimes), which is only 32 bits wide on 32-bit
platforms, which causes `(lcn << lclusterbits)` to be truncated
at 4 GiB.
In order to consolidate the logic, just use `u64` consistently
around the codebase.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/r/20260420034612.1899973-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: use list_del_rcu for netlink hooks
nft_netdev_unregister_hooks and __nft_unregister_flowtable_net_hooks need
to use list_del_rcu(), this list can be walked by concurrent dumpers.
Add a new helper and use it consistently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/hns: Fix WQ_MEM_RECLAIM warning
When sunrpc is used, if a reset triggered, our wq may lead the
following trace:
workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM xprtiod:xprt_rdma_connect_worker [rpcrdma]
is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM hns_roce_irq_workq:flush_work_handle
[hns_roce_hw_v2]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8250 at kernel/workqueue.c:2644 check_flush_dependency+0xe0/0x144
Call trace:
check_flush_dependency+0xe0/0x144
start_flush_work.constprop.0+0x1d0/0x2f0
__flush_work.isra.0+0x40/0xb0
flush_work+0x14/0x30
hns_roce_v2_destroy_qp+0xac/0x1e0 [hns_roce_hw_v2]
ib_destroy_qp_user+0x9c/0x2b4
rdma_destroy_qp+0x34/0xb0
rpcrdma_ep_destroy+0x28/0xcc [rpcrdma]
rpcrdma_ep_put+0x74/0xb4 [rpcrdma]
rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x1d8/0x260 [rpcrdma]
xprt_rdma_connect_worker+0xc0/0x120 [rpcrdma]
process_one_work+0x1cc/0x4d0
worker_thread+0x154/0x414
kthread+0x104/0x144
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Since QP destruction frees memory, this wq should have the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
AppArmor: Allow apparmor to handle unaligned dfa tables
The dfa tables can originate from kernel or userspace and 8-byte alignment
isn't always guaranteed and as such may trigger unaligned memory accesses
on various architectures. Resulting in the following
[ 73.901376] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 341 at security/apparmor/match.c:316 aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720
[ 74.015867] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc evdev flash sg drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight i2c_core configfs nfnetlink autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid sr_mod hid cdrom
sd_mod ata_generic ohci_pci ehci_pci ehci_hcd ohci_hcd pata_ali libata sym53c8xx scsi_transport_spi tg3 scsi_mod usbcore libphy scsi_common mdio_bus usb_common
[ 74.428977] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 341 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6+ #9 NONE
[ 74.536543] Call Trace:
[ 74.568561] [<0000000000434c24>] dump_stack+0x8/0x18
[ 74.633757] [<0000000000476438>] __warn+0xd8/0x100
[ 74.696664] [<00000000004296d4>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x34/0x74
[ 74.771006] [<00000000008db28c>] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720
[ 74.843062] [<00000000008e643c>] unpack_pdb+0xbc/0x7e0
[ 74.910545] [<00000000008e7740>] unpack_profile+0xbe0/0x1300
[ 74.984888] [<00000000008e82e0>] aa_unpack+0xe0/0x6a0
[ 75.051226] [<00000000008e3ec4>] aa_replace_profiles+0x64/0x1160
[ 75.130144] [<00000000008d4d90>] policy_update+0xf0/0x280
[ 75.201057] [<00000000008d4fc8>] profile_replace+0xa8/0x100
[ 75.274258] [<0000000000766bd0>] vfs_write+0x90/0x420
[ 75.340594] [<00000000007670cc>] ksys_write+0x4c/0xe0
[ 75.406932] [<0000000000767174>] sys_write+0x14/0x40
[ 75.472126] [<0000000000406174>] linux_sparc_syscall+0x34/0x44
[ 75.548802] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 75.609503] dfa blob stream 0xfff0000008926b96 not aligned.
[ 75.682695] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[8db2a8] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6e8/0x720
Work around it by using the get_unaligned_xx() helpers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fsl: fix controller deregistration
Make sure to deregister the controller before releasing underlying
resources like DMA during driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: rspi: fix controller deregistration
Make sure to deregister the controller before releasing underlying
resources like DMA during driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: mpc52xx: fix controller deregistration
Make sure to deregister the controller before disabling and releasing
underlying resources like interrupts and gpios during driver unbind. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event()
Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever
frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the
RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before
the srq object is finished initializing.
Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use
refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects,
and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix fsck inconsistency caused by FGGC of node block
During FGGC node block migration, fsck may incorrectly treat the
migrated node block as fsync-written data.
The reproduction scenario:
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# seq 1 2048 | xargs -n 1 ./test_sync // write inline inode and sync
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# rm -f 1
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# sync
root@vm:/mnt/f2fs# f2fs_io gc_range // move data block in sync mode and not write CP
SPO, "fsck --dry-run" find inode has already checkpointed but still
with DENT_BIT_SHIFT set
The root cause is that GC does not clear the dentry mark and fsync mark
during node block migration, leading fsck to misinterpret them as
user-issued fsync writes.
In BGGC mode, node block migration is handled by f2fs_sync_node_pages(),
which guarantees the dentry and fsync marks are cleared before writing.
This patch move the set/clear of the fsync|dentry marks into
__write_node_folio to make the logic clearer, and ensures the
fsync|dentry mark is cleared in FGGC. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: microchip-core-qspi: control built-in cs manually
The coreQSPI IP supports only a single chip select, which is
automagically operated by the hardware - set low when the transmit
buffer first gets written to and set high when the number of bytes
written to the TOTALBYTES field of the FRAMES register have been sent on
the bus. Additional devices must use GPIOs for their chip selects.
It was reported to me that if there are two devices attached to this
QSPI controller that the in-built chip select is set low while linux
tries to access the device attached to the GPIO.
This went undetected as the boards that connected multiple devices to
the SPI controller all exclusively used GPIOs for chip selects, not
relying on the built-in chip select at all. It turns out that this was
because the built-in chip select, when controlled automagically, is set
low when active and high when inactive, thereby ruling out its use for
active-high devices or devices that need to transmit with the chip
select disabled.
Modify the driver so that it controls chip select directly, retaining
the behaviour for mem_ops of setting the chip select active for the
entire duration of the transfer in the exec_op callback. For regular
transfers, implement the set_cs callback for the core to use.
As part of this, the existing setup callback, mchp_coreqspi_setup_op(),
is removed. Modifying the CLKIDLE field is not safe to do during
operation when there are multiple devices, so this code is removed
entirely. Setting the MASTER and ENABLE fields is something that can be
done once at probe, it doesn't need to be re-run for each device.
Instead the new setup callback sets the built-in chip select to its
inactive state for active-low devices, as the reset value of the chip
select in software controlled mode is low. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down context entry
When tearing down a context entry, the current implementation zeros the
entire 128-bit entry using multiple 64-bit writes. This creates a window
where the hardware can fetch a "torn" entry — where some fields are
already zeroed while the 'Present' bit is still set — leading to
unpredictable behavior or spurious faults.
While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder writes
to the two 64-bit halves of the context entry. Even without compiler
reordering, the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be atomic with
respect to multiple CPU writes.
Align with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec
(Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake:
1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the context entry first to
signal the transition of ownership from hardware to software.
2. Use dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to the IOMMU.
3. Perform the required cache and context-cache invalidation to ensure
hardware no longer has cached references to the entry.
4. Fully zero out the entry only after the invalidation is complete.
Also, add a dma_wmb() to context_set_present() to ensure the entry
is fully initialized before the 'Present' bit becomes visible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix EEXIST abort due to non-consecutive gaps in chunk allocation
I have been observing a number of systems aborting at
insert_dev_extents() in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). The
following is a sample stack trace of such an abort coming from forced
chunk allocation (typically behind CONFIG_BTRFS_EXPERIMENTAL) but this
can theoretically happen to any DUP chunk allocation.
[81.801] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[81.801] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -17)
[81.801] WARNING: fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2876 at btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x721/0x770 [btrfs], CPU#1: bash/319
[81.802] Modules linked in: virtio_net btrfs xor zstd_compress raid6_pq null_blk
[81.803] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 319 Comm: bash Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.19.0-rc6+ #319 NONE
[81.803] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.17.0-2-2 04/01/2014
[81.804] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x723/0x770 [btrfs]
[81.806] RSP: 0018:ffffa36241a6bce8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[81.806] RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: ffff8e699921e400 RCX: 0000000000000000
[81.807] RDX: 0000000002040001 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: ffffffffc0608bf0
[81.807] RBP: 00000000ffffffef R08: ffff8e69830f6000 R09: 0000000000000007
[81.808] R10: ffff8e699921e5e8 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8e6999228000
[81.808] R13: ffff8e6984d82000 R14: ffff8e69966a69c0 R15: ffff8e69aa47b000
[81.809] FS: 00007fec6bdd9740(0000) GS:ffff8e6b1b379000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[81.809] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[81.810] CR2: 00005604833670f0 CR3: 0000000116679000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[81.810] Call Trace:
[81.810] <TASK>
[81.810] __btrfs_end_transaction+0x3e/0x2b0 [btrfs]
[81.811] btrfs_force_chunk_alloc_store+0xcd/0x140 [btrfs]
[81.811] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x15f/0x240
[81.812] vfs_write+0x264/0x500
[81.812] ksys_write+0x6c/0xe0
[81.812] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x770
[81.812] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[81.813] RIP: 0033:0x7fec6be66197
[81.814] RSP: 002b:00007fffb159dd30 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[81.815] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fec6bdd9740 RCX: 00007fec6be66197
[81.815] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000560483374f80 RDI: 0000000000000001
[81.816] RBP: 0000560483374f80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[81.816] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000002
[81.817] R13: 00007fec6bfb85c0 R14: 00007fec6bfb5ee0 R15: 00005604833729c0
[81.817] </TASK>
[81.817] irq event stamp: 20039
[81.818] hardirqs last enabled at (20047): [<ffffffff99a68302>] __up_console_sem+0x52/0x60
[81.818] hardirqs last disabled at (20056): [<ffffffff99a682e7>] __up_console_sem+0x37/0x60
[81.819] softirqs last enabled at (19470): [<ffffffff999d2b46>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0
[81.819] softirqs last disabled at (19463): [<ffffffff999d2b46>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x96/0xc0
[81.820] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[81.820] BTRFS: error (device dm-7 state A) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2876: errno=-17 Object already exists
Inspecting these aborts with drgn, I observed a pattern of overlapping
chunk_maps. Note how stripe 1 of the first chunk overlaps in physical
address with stripe 0 of the second chunk.
Physical Start Physical End Length Logical Type Stripe
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0x0000000102500000 0x0000000142500000 1.0G 0x0000000641d00000 META|DUP 0/2
0x0000000142500000 0x0000000182500000 1.0G 0x0000000641d00000 META|DUP 1/2
0x0000000142500000 0x0000000182500000 1.0G 0x0000000601d00000 META|DUP 0/2
0x0000000182500000 0x00000001c2500000 1.0G 0x0000000601d00000 META|DUP 1/2
Now how could this possibly happen? All chunk allocation is
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down PASID entry
The Intel VT-d Scalable Mode PASID table entry consists of 512 bits (64
bytes). When tearing down an entry, the current implementation zeros the
entire 64-byte structure immediately using multiple 64-bit writes.
Since the IOMMU hardware may fetch these 64 bytes using multiple
internal transactions (e.g., four 128-bit bursts), updating or zeroing
the entire entry while it is active (P=1) risks a "torn" read. If a
hardware fetch occurs simultaneously with the CPU zeroing the entry, the
hardware could observe an inconsistent state, leading to unpredictable
behavior or spurious faults.
Follow the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec
(Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake:
1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the PASID entry.
2. Use a dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to hardware
before proceeding.
3. Execute the required invalidation sequence (PASID cache, IOTLB, and
Device-TLB flush) to ensure the hardware has released all cached
references.
4. Only after the flushes are complete, zero out the remaining fields
of the PASID entry.
Also, add a dma_wmb() in pasid_set_present() to ensure that all other
fields of the PASID entry are visible to the hardware before the Present
bit is set. |
