| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix readahead synchronisation issues by loading all folios upfront
There are some synchronisation issues that derive from the app thread
adding more folios to the rolling buffer whilst the collector thread is
looking at them or trying to clear them, such as determining the setting of
front_folio_order when the next folio hasn't been added yet,
The reason for the rolling buffer approach is that loading the buffer
upfront and then dropping all the refs just acquired is quite a slow
operation, and loading progressively allows some of the cost to be deferred
until after at least some of the I/O is started.
Instead, a better way is to load all the folios into the rolling buffer
upfront - and then drop the refs later, once the I/O is in progress. (Even
better would be for the refs not to be there at all.)
Fix this by changing the rolling buffer loader to load all the folios
selected by the VM for readahead upfront into the folio queue. The folio
queue is allocated a batch worth at a time as we don't know how many folios
are involved (the readahead_control struct, alas, has a page count, not a
folio count).
The folio refs acquired from readahead are then dropped in bulk once the
first subrequest is dispatched as it's quite a slow operation. The
collector waits for NETFS_RREQ_NEED_PUT_RA_REFS to be cleared so that it
doesn't unlock folios before the xarray has been scanned for them.
This simplifies the buffer handling later and isn't noticeably slower as
the xarray doesn't need to be modified and the folios are all already
pre-locked. |
| A security flaw has been discovered in a2aproject a2a-rs up to 0.4.4. The affected element is the function InMemoryTaskStore::update of the file a2a-server/src/task_store/inmemory.rs. The manipulation results in race condition. The attack may be performed from remote. The patch is identified as 7050c7d329238539424ee46440e23b91c4825bee. It is advisable to implement a patch to correct this issue. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftReadWriteLock and AsyncSoftReadWriteLock cache a successful check of the <path>.rw lock tree and resolve its names again during later record operations, allowing another local user who can replace that tree after the first acquisition to redirect lock-record writes into directories writable by the lock user. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 3.22.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock can break a stale marker after an attacker frees its own marker following the stale read, an honest contender creates a live successor on the reused inode, and the successor's modification time is not newer than the saved observation, causing the live marker to be removed and two holders to be admitted. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Use after free in Windows Storage allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Connected Devices Platform Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_setattr_size()
ntfs_setattr_size() updates i_size and resizes the on-disk attribute
without holding mapping->invalidate_lock. Page faults take the lock
shared, so a fault racing the resize can resolve a VCN against the
transient runlist state of ntfs_non_resident_attr_expand() and fail
with a spurious SIGBUS, and can interleave with the size-change
epilogue (truncate_pagecache(), i_size_write(),
pagecache_isize_extended()).
Take invalidate_lock exclusively around the whole resize after
inode_dio_wait(), matching the fallocate path and other filesystems
such as xfs, which wraps truncate in its mmaplock (= invalidate_lock). |
| Use after free in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. From 4.1.0 until 4.2.1, SoftFileLock versions from 4.1.0 can reuse a stale observation when an attacker pre-dates and removes its own marker, at least two lock-user processes are waiting, coarse or matching modification times preserve the observation, and an honest contender creates a fresh marker on the reused inode, causing that live marker to be removed as stale. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| filelock is a platform-independent file lock for Python. Prior to 4.2.1, UnixFileLock can truncate a regular file renamed onto the lock path when another local user has actual rename permission, or hard-linked there under a permissive hard-link policy; when an explicit mode is requested, affected versions from 3.10.2 can also change that file's mode. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.1. |
| Use after free in Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Win32K allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: serialize vblank counter reads against GPU reset
The vblank counter callback reads display registers and scanout
position without holding reset_domain->sem. During GPU recovery,
display commit work can call the callback while reset owns the
semaphore for writing. The hardware access then triggers the
lockdep_assert_held() in amdgpu_device_skip_hw_access() and sets
TAINT_WARN when lockdep is enabled.
Try to acquire the reset semaphore for reading before accessing the
hardware, and hold it across the counter and scanout-position reads.
If reset is already in progress, return DRM's cached software vblank
count instead. This avoids blocking behind reset and avoids accessing
display hardware while it is being reset.
The cached count is less accurate than the hardware count, but is
used only when reset prevents a safe hardware read. This addresses
the reset-time warning from this vblank path; it does not suppress or
fix unrelated lockdep warnings.
(cherry picked from commit 51a4359f7431a4be5e42803c8bdaf7e0e5be2934) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from PSC buffer
Use READ_ONCE() when reading entries/indices from the guest-accessible
Page State Change buffer to defend against TOCTOU bugs.
Don't bother with READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() for cases where KVM is writing
(and not consuming the result!), as the guest isn't supposed to touch the
buffer while it's being processed. I.e. using READ_ONCE() is all about
protecting against misbehaving guests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: imx: Add a channel shutdown field
sashiko complained about possible teardown problem. The scenario
CPU 0 CPU 1
imx_mu_isr() imx_mu_shutdown()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, 0, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, cp->idx));
imx_mu_specific_rx()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, 0), 0);
free_irq()
The RX event remains enabled because in this short window the RX event
was disabled in ->shutdown() while the interrupt was active and then
enabled again by the ISR while ->shutdown waited in free_irq().
This race requires timing and if happens can be problematic on shared
handlers if the "removed" channel triggers an interrupt. In this case
the irq-core will shutdown the interrupt with the "nobody cared"
message.
Introduce imx_mu_con_priv::shutdown to signal that the channel is
shutting down. This flag is set with the lock held (by
imx_mu_xcr_clr_shut()). The unmask side uses imx_mu_xcr_set_act() which
only enables the event if the channel has not been shutdown and
serialises on the same lock. |
| Wheels 3.0.0 through 4.1.1 can disclose detailed exceptions when allowIPBasedDebugAccess=true (disabled by default). An allowed administrator request changes error/debug-display settings in shared application scope. If it overlaps with an unauthorized client's request that raises an error, that client can receive full exception details, including tag context or a serialized exception, and any sensitive data they contain. This race does not bypass the production gate protecting developer tools. This is fixed in 4.1.2. |
| AliasVault is a privacy-first password manager with built-in email aliasing. Prior to 0.30.3, the AliasVault server API favicon extractor validates a user-supplied hostname with a first DNS lookup but allows the HTTP client to perform a second DNS lookup when connecting. An authenticated low-privileged user operating an attacker-controlled authoritative DNS server can return a public address during validation and a private address during connection, causing a publicly reachable self-hosted server to issue HTTP or HTTPS requests to internal hosts. A valid image response is returned in Base64 form, while other responses can expose limited timing and error information for internal-network reconnaissance. Exploitation requires a publicly reachable self-hosted instance with public registration enabled, an authenticated AliasVault account, an attacker-controlled authoritative DNS server, and a resolver that permits rebinding; default checks limit requests to ports 80 and 443. The browser extensions, web application, and mobile applications are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.30.3. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Clipboard User Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Storage allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
