| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| open62541 1.5.5 contains an out-of-bounds read in the client-side function responseReadNamespacesArray() in src/client/ua_client_connect.c. |
| OpenSIPS is a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) server implementation. In versions prior to 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1, the find_line_delimiter() function in the multipart body parser performs an out-of-bounds read via strncmp() when searching for MIME boundary delimiters. After finding a -- pattern near the end of the body, the function compares delimiter.len bytes (typically 20-70) starting from a position at or past the logical end of the body buffer, reading past the body boundary. The bug triggers when a SIP message has Content-Type: multipart/mixed with a boundary parameter and its body contains -- within two to three bytes of the body's end without being followed by the actual boundary delimiter. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.6.6 and 4.0.0-rc1. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.6 and iPadOS 26.6, macOS Tahoe 26.6, tvOS 26.6, visionOS 26.6, watchOS 26.6. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| The issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination. |
| A weakness has been identified in Systerel S2OPC up to 1.7.3. This affects the function LockedStaMac_ProcessMsg_DeleteMonitoredItemsResponse of the file src/ClientServer/frontend/client_wrapper/internal/state_machine.c of the component DeleteMonitoredItemsRequest Handler. This manipulation causes out-of-bounds read. The attack can only be executed locally. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.3, an out-of-bounds heap read could occur in the C response parser while building an error message for a malformed response. An attacker controlled server, or possibly an accidental response, could trigger a DoS in the client. The vulnerable path was error message construction in aiohttp/_http_parser.pyx, where an llhttp error-position pointer was used to build a snippet for malformed chunked responses and malformed request or response bytes at the buffer end. This issue is fixed in version 3.14.3. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. Mounting a maliciously crafted disk image may cause unexpected system termination or corrupt kernel memory. |
| An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds checking. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. Parsing a maliciously crafted file may lead to an unexpected app termination. |
| The issue was addressed with improved bounds checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to disclose kernel memory. |
| Out of bounds read in Media in Google Chrome on Mac prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to potentially perform a sandbox escape via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix an out-of-bounds shift when invalidating TLB
When the size of the range invalidated is larger than
rounddown_pow_of_two(ULONG_MAX),
The function macro roundup_pow_of_two(length) will hit an out-of-bounds
shift [1].
Use a full TLB invalidation for such cases.
v2:
- Use a define for the range size limit over which we use a full
TLB invalidation. (Lucas)
- Use a better calculation of the limit.
[1]:
[ 39.202421] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 39.202657] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13
[ 39.202673] shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
[ 39.202688] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 3129 Comm: xe_exec_system_ Tainted: G U 6.14.0+ #10
[ 39.202690] Tainted: [U]=USER
[ 39.202690] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023
[ 39.202691] Call Trace:
[ 39.202692] <TASK>
[ 39.202695] dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0
[ 39.202699] ubsan_epilogue+0x5/0x30
[ 39.202701] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0x61/0xe6
[ 39.202705] xe_gt_tlb_invalidation_range.cold+0x1d/0x3a [xe]
[ 39.202800] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[ 39.202803] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70
[ 39.202806] xe_svm_invalidate+0x459/0x700 [xe]
[ 39.202897] drm_gpusvm_notifier_invalidate+0x4d/0x70 [drm_gpusvm]
[ 39.202900] __mmu_notifier_release+0x1f5/0x270
[ 39.202905] exit_mmap+0x40e/0x450
[ 39.202912] __mmput+0x45/0x110
[ 39.202914] exit_mm+0xc5/0x130
[ 39.202916] do_exit+0x21c/0x500
[ 39.202918] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x190
[ 39.202920] do_group_exit+0x36/0xa0
[ 39.202922] get_signal+0x8f8/0x900
[ 39.202926] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x35/0x100
[ 39.202930] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1fc/0x290
[ 39.202932] do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180
[ 39.202934] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x59f/0x8a0
[ 39.202937] ? lock_release+0xd2/0x2a0
[ 39.202939] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5a9/0x8a0
[ 39.202942] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0
[ 39.202944] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
[ 39.202946] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
[ 39.202947] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x25/0x80
[ 39.202950] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 39.202952] RIP: 0033:0x7fa945e543e1
[ 39.202961] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fa945e543b7.
[ 39.202962] RSP: 002b:00007ffca8fb4170 EFLAGS: 00000293
[ 39.202963] RAX: 000000000000003d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa945e543e3
[ 39.202964] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffca8fb41ac RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[ 39.202964] RBP: 00007ffca8fb4190 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fa945f600a0
[ 39.202965] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 39.202966] R13: 00007fa9460dd310 R14: 00007ffca8fb41ac R15: 0000000000000000
[ 39.202970] </TASK>
[ 39.202970] ---[ end trace ]---
(cherry picked from commit b88f48f86500bc0b44b4f73ac66d500a40d320ad) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
OPP: add index check to assert to avoid buffer overflow in _read_freq()
Pass the freq index to the assert function to make sure
we do not read a freq out of the opp->rates[] table when called
from the indexed variants:
dev_pm_opp_find_freq_exact_indexed() or
dev_pm_opp_find_freq_ceil/floor_indexed().
Add a secondary parameter to the assert function, unused
for assert_single_clk() then add assert_clk_index() which
will check for the clock index when called from the _indexed()
find functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: Fix the out of bound issue of vmemmap address
In sparse vmemmap model, the virtual address of vmemmap is calculated as:
((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT)).
And the struct page's va can be calculated with an offset:
(vmemmap + (pfn)).
However, when initializing struct pages, kernel actually starts from the
first page from the same section that phys_ram_base belongs to. If the
first page's physical address is not (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT), then
we get an va below VMEMMAP_START when calculating va for it's struct page.
For example, if phys_ram_base starts from 0x82000000 with pfn 0x82000, the
first page in the same section is actually pfn 0x80000. During
init_unavailable_range(), we will initialize struct page for pfn 0x80000
with virtual address ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - 0x2000), which is
below VMEMMAP_START as well as PCI_IO_END.
This commit fixes this bug by introducing a new variable
'vmemmap_start_pfn' which is aligned with memory section size and using
it to calculate vmemmap address instead of phys_ram_base. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/cpum_sf: Fix and protect memory allocation of SDBs with mutex
Reservation of the PMU hardware is done at first event creation
and is protected by a pair of mutex_lock() and mutex_unlock().
After reservation of the PMU hardware the memory
required for the PMUs the event is to be installed on is
allocated by allocate_buffers() and alloc_sampling_buffer().
This done outside of the mutex protection.
Without mutex protection two or more concurrent invocations of
perf_event_init() may run in parallel.
This can lead to allocation of Sample Data Blocks (SDBs)
multiple times for the same PMU.
Prevent this and protect memory allocation of SDBs by
mutex. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
acpi: nfit: vmalloc-out-of-bounds Read in acpi_nfit_ctl
Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/
core.c:416 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0
drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459
The issue occurs in cmd_to_func when the call_pkg->nd_reserved2
array is accessed without verifying that call_pkg points to a buffer
that is appropriately sized as a struct nd_cmd_pkg. This can lead
to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the buffer does not
have sufficient space.
To address this, a check was added in acpi_nfit_ctl() to ensure that
buf is not NULL and that buf_len is less than sizeof(*call_pkg)
before accessing it. This ensures safe access to the members of
call_pkg, including the nd_reserved2 array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix Out-of-Bounds Read in ksmbd_vfs_stream_read
An offset from client could be a negative value, It could lead
to an out-of-bounds read from the stream_buf.
Note that this issue is coming when setting
'vfs objects = streams_xattr parameter' in ksmbd.conf. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: fix shift-out-of-bounds in dbSplit
When dmt_budmin is less than zero, it causes errors
in the later stages. Added a check to return an error beforehand
in dbAllocCtl itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()
In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc->nodes with the
proc->inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to
acquire the node->lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with
binder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc->nodes
rbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken
iteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from
binder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124
Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
rb_next+0xfc/0x124
binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534
binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40
[...]
==================================================================
This is possible because proc->nodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes
(list) share entries in binder_node through a union:
struct binder_node {
[...]
union {
struct rb_node rb_node;
struct hlist_node dead_node;
};
Fix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply
break out of the iteration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ring-buffer: Fix overflow in __rb_map_vma
An overflow occurred when performing the following calculation:
nr_pages = ((nr_subbufs + 1) << subbuf_order) - pgoff;
Add a check before the calculation to avoid this problem.
syzbot reported this as a slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880767dd2b8 by task syz-executor187/5836
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5836 Comm: syz-executor187 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-syzkaller-00159-gf932fb9b4074 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/25/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602
__rb_map_vma+0x9ab/0xae0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7058
ring_buffer_map+0x56e/0x9b0 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c:7138
tracing_buffers_mmap+0xa6/0x120 kernel/trace/trace.c:8482
call_mmap include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]
mmap_file mm/internal.h:124 [inline]
__mmap_new_file_vma mm/vma.c:2291 [inline]
__mmap_new_vma mm/vma.c:2355 [inline]
__mmap_region+0x1786/0x2670 mm/vma.c:2456
mmap_region+0x127/0x320 mm/mmap.c:1348
do_mmap+0xc00/0xfc0 mm/mmap.c:496
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x1ba/0x360 mm/util.c:580
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x32c/0x5c0 mm/mmap.c:542
__do_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:89 [inline]
__se_sys_mmap arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82 [inline]
__x64_sys_mmap+0x125/0x190 arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c:82
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The reproducer for this bug is:
------------------------8<-------------------------
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int page_size = getpagesize();
int fd;
void *meta;
system("echo 1 > /sys/kernel/tracing/buffer_size_kb");
fd = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/per_cpu/cpu0/trace_pipe_raw", O_RDONLY);
meta = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, page_size * 5);
}
------------------------>8------------------------- |
